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  Executive Summary 
 
A number of Canadian acquisition announcements over the past few years have generated 
significant debate about a variety of issues like whether or not Canada should have a separate 
procurement agency, whether or not industrial and regional benefits are appropriate and 
whether or not Canadian companies should be given preference over international companies. 
In discussions about improving our procurement process Australia is often used as an example 
because the nations are generally considered to be similar in size with respect to GDP, 
population and military. This study examines Australia’s approach to establishing a defence 
industry policy with a set of Priority Industry Capabilities and how that policy connects with 
military procurement in order to identify those lessons that might be useful for Canada as it 
seeks to improve its own procurement process and its relationship with the defence industry. 
The study looks at some important background information on the Australian experience and 
then looks more specifically at the most recent articulation of policies in Australia. Although 
Australia is not without its own challenges, there are a number of lessons that stand out for 
Canada.  This study discusses the lessons for Canada and recommends that government spends 
the time and effort required to connect a series of related policy documents that provides 
industry and others with an articulation of what the government of the day intends to do and 
what their priorities are moving forward. It also recommends a holistic review of the entire 
procurement process to determine what is working well and what actually needs fixing would be 
useful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Executive Summary 
 
The Arctic sea-ice is in a state of rapid decline. Barriers to navigation that once doomed the likes 
of Sir John Franklin and closed the shortcut to the Orient now seem to be melting away. The 
prospect of shorter, transpolar transportation routes linking Asian and Western markets has 
inspired excitement and fear, and particularly the latter when it comes to Canadian sovereignty.  
 
This paper confirms recent studies suggesting that, in spite of the general trend towards reduced 
ice cover in the Arctic Basin, environmental variability, scarce infrastructure and other 
navigational aids, and uncertain economics make it unlikely that the Northwest Passage will 
emerge as a viable trans-shipping route in the foreseeable future. Instead, the region is likely to 
witness a steady increase in resource, resupply, and tourist destinational shipping. Accordingly, 
concerns that this increased activity will adversely affect Canadian sovereignty are misplaced. 
Rather than calling into question Canadian control, foreign vessels engaged in local activities are 
likely to reinforce Canada’s legal position by demonstrating an international acceptance of 
Canadian laws and regulations. 
 
Rather than worrying about the “sovereignty” ramifications of Arctic shipping, the Canadian 
government should focus its short – and medium – term energies on the practical requirements 
of developing and maintaining safe shipping routes. At the heart of this requirement is ensuring 
that such activity is beneficial to Inuit, whose traditional “highways” will double as transits 
routes for resource carriers and cruise liners. If developed with an eye to those most directly 
affected, Canada’s Arctic waters can become a well-managed route to an increasingly attractive 
region, making our Arctic a destination rather than mere space through which to pass. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ces dern ères années, des annonces d’acquisitions canadiennes ont suscité la controvers  et soulevé
plus eurs questions. Le Canada doit-il se do er de son propre organisme d’approvisionnement?
Les retombées sur le secteur et les régions sont-ell  suffisante ? Les entr prises canadienne
doivent-elles avoir préséance sur les entreprises étrangères? Tels sont certai s es sujets qui ont 
alimenté le débat. L’Australie est souvent citée en exemple lors des discussions sur l’amélioration 
de notre processus d’approvisionnement, car la taille de son PIB, de sa population et de son 
secteur militaire est comparable à la nôtre. Dans la présente étude, nous examinons la stratégie de 
l’Australie relative à la création d’une politique pour l’industrie de défense, assortie d’un ensemble 
de capacités militaires prioritaires, et nous explorons la façon dont cette politique intègre les 
approvisionnements militaires. Nous espérons ainsi tirer des leçons utiles pour le Canada, qui cherche 
à améliorer son propre processus d’approvisionnement et ses relations avec l’industrie militaire. 
Dans ce document, nous commençons par fournir certains renseignements généraux importants 
sur l’expérience australienne, puis nous nous penchons sur les politiques élaborées récemment en 
Australie. Il est certain que l’Australie n’est pas au bout de ses peines, mais nous pouvons déjà 
tirer un enseignement de son approche. Plus loin dans l’étude, nous discutons de ces leçons pour le 
Canada et nous recommandons que le gouvernement consacre temps et efforts à relier le contenu 
d’un ensemble de documents de politique connexes, de manière à fournir aux intervenants de 
l’industrie et d’ailleurs une idée des intentions et des priorités du gouvernement en place. Nous 
proposons également un examen global de l’ensemble du processus d’approvisionnement, afin de 
déterminer les secteurs qui donnent satisfaction et ceux qui doivent être améliorés.
Résumé
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Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities 
The main strength of this latest stage in the evolution of defence industry 
policy is its comprehensive catalogue and description of the range of 
practical, funded programs in place to foster the development of the 
Australian defence industry base     
      - Robert Wylie1 
 
he Canadian government’s decision and subsequent acquisition announcements over 
the past few years have generated significant debate about whether or not Canada 
should have a separate procurement agency, whether or not industrial and regional 
benefits are appropriate and whether or not Canadian companies should be given 
preference over international companies to name just three issues out of the many that have 
been raised by the media, government officials and industry. Much of this debate is connected to 
the 2008 release of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) and the significant increase in 
funding specifically identified within the strategy for military procurement. More importantly, 
since the release of the CFDS, a number of the military procurement projects identified in the 
strategy have not proceeded as planned and could be considered political liabilities for the 
government. They are problematic in terms of the industry’s ability to meet the requirements 
based on the funding available and/or problematic in terms of industry concerns about the 
process being unfair and biased to one solution. This set of conditions has created an 
environment where serious consideration is now being given to changing how procurement is 
done in Canada. 
 
Wylie's quote above was made in reference to Australia's most recent defence industry policy 
statement Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter and More Agile Defence 
Industrial Base.2 Wylie’s statement captures two issues that have been consistently lacking in 
the relationship between Canada's defence industry and military procurement. First, the 
statement implies that there is a comprehensive catalogue and description of funded programs 
to foster the development of Australian defence industry. This is something that has never been 
done in Canada, although some might argue that the CFDS does provide a list of large 
procurement projects. Second, the statement implies that this is the latest stage in the evolution 
of defence industry policy which in and of itself implies that Australia has had previous defence 
industry policy statements. Again, a defence industry policy statement is something that has not 
been done in Canada. 
 
Australia is often used as an example for how Canada might improve both its procurement 
process and its relationship with industry because the nations are generally considered to be 
similar in size with respect to GDP, population and military. This paper will examine Australia’s 
approach to establishing a defence industry policy and how that policy connects with military 
procurement in order to identify lessons that might be useful for Canada as it seeks to improve 
its procurement process and its relationship with the defence industry. The study will begin with 
a brief look at some important background information on the Australian experience and then 
                                                          
1
 Robert Wylie, “Defence Industry Policy 2010: The Combet Iteration,” Security Challenges 6, no.3 (Spring 2010): 59. 
2 Australia, Department of Defence, Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter and More Agile Defence 
Industrial Base (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010). 
 
T 
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look more specifically at the most recent articulation of defence policy and defence industrial 
policy. Next, the study will identify some of the concerns about the policy that have been raised 
by industry and others. Finally the study will discuss what lessons Canada can take from the 
Australian experience beginning with an examination of the most recent government and 
industry initiatives that are attempting to resolve the procurement challenges in Canada. 
 
BACKGROUND ISSUES TO AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Although the intention of this paper is to look at the most recent articulation of defence 
industrial policy, it is important to note that Australia has been issuing defence and defence 
industry policy papers on a fairly consistent basis since before 2000. For example, since 2000 
Australia has issued three industrial policy papers, four defence policy papers, and conducted 
two formal procurement reviews.3 In that same period Canada has issued one policy paper in 
2005, the Liberal Government’s Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and 
Influence in the World, which included a chapter on defence. This was the first policy statement 
since 1994 and a year after its release the government was replaced by the electorate. Since then, 
the Conservative Government has not issued a defence policy statement, although many 
consider the Canada First Defence Strategy the next best thing.  
 
With respect to defence industrial policy, Canada has not issued a separate defence industrial 
policy statement. Canada has traditionally included comments on defence industry issues as 
part of its defence policy and this has varied from a few paragraphs to a few pages.4 More 
specifically, a review of Canada’s defence policy statements would indicate that Canada devotes 
attention to the defence industry within its defence policy statements only when the government 
of the day plans to make significant investments in defence. This lack of a specific defence 
industrial policy is at odds with many of our traditional Allies, particularly since the end of the 
Cold War and the significant restructuring and consolidation of national defence industries that 
has occurred.5 It is in this context that an examination of Australia’s approach to this issue is 
useful. Both Canada and Australia have similar problems in terms of scale and scope for their 
defence industries, but Australia has taken what appears to be a much more proactive and 
transparent approach. 
 
The starting point for any discussion on Australia’s defence industrial policy is the connection 
that Australia has made between its defence policy, its defence industrial policy and the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) capability requirements.6 In addition, the process of developing 
                                                          
3 Australia issued defence policy papers in 2000, 2007, and 2009; defence industrial policies in 2000, 2007 and 
2010; procurement reviews in 2003 and 2008.  In discussing the 2007 defence industry policy, Robert Wylie 
indicated it was Australia’s “tenth attempt to promulgate an effective policy in the last two decades.” See Robert 
Wylie, “A Defence Policy for Australian Industry: Are We There Yet?” Security Challenges 3, no. 2 (June 2007): 53.   
4 For example, Defence in the 70s, the defence white paper issued in 1971 has two paragraphs that make tangential 
references to the defence industry with “the main economic benefits of defence activities have been scientific, 
technological and industrial[.]” and “Defence Industrial Research Program and programs of the Department of 
Industry, Trade and Commerce play an important role in maintaining a viable defence industrial base.” See Canada, 
Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1971), 14. 
5 Of note, the three Canadian Ministers of the Crown most directly involved with procurement (Defence, Public Works 
and Industry) requested the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) conduct a study on 
their behalf in order to obtain industry’s views on how to improve the procurement process. Although the Association 
has released parts of the study on its website, there has not been a formal public response from government that 
indicates which if any of the recommendations will be acted upon. 
6 In the most fundamental context the starting point for any discussion on a defence industry should be a definitional 
discussion about what a defence industry is and what a defence industrial base is. This paper will avoid that 
discussion primarily because the meaning of defence industry is rather ambiguous.  The literature has multiple 
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policy during the past decade has also included significant public input and this has helped the 
government of the day move forward with implementing its policies. More importantly, 
although the political party in power has changed the overall approach to defence has not. There 
is consistency in policy between what the Liberal Party issued in 2007, what the Labour Party 
issued in 2009, 2010 and most recently in 2013.  
 
The 2007 policy statement Australia’s National  Security: A Defence Update 2007 indicated 
that it was important for Australian industry to “continue to make a significant contribution to 
delivering the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) in a timely and cost-effective way.”7 The same 
document indicated that “Australia’s defence industry is crucial to our national security and it 
underpins the Defence organisation’s ability to perform its mission.”8 The actual defence 
industrial policy Defence and Industry Policy Statement 2007 had essentially the same wording 
and also articulated an intention to connect the defence industry policy to “the Government’s 
broader approach to Australian industry that seeks to create sustainable prosperity for the 
nation.”9 
 
Three additional issues are important from the 2007 defence industry policy statement. First, 
there was a clear connection to the 2003 procurement review when the government indicated 
that “a central plank of the procurement reforms is the close involvement of industry prior to 
project approval to assist in refining costs, identifying risks and clarifying capability 
requirements.”10 By this statement the government was acknowledging its belief that defence 
procurement was the only concrete way to shape Australia’s defence industrial base. 
 
Second, the 2007 policy statement identified Priority Industry Capabilities (PICs) and connected 
those capabilities to the classified Defence Planning Guidance and the public version of the 
Defence Capability Plan.11 This connection was to be achieved by including the requirement for 
a Defence Industry Self-Reliance Plan, – a classified document that would complement the 
Defence Capability Plan. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the internal classified 
documents and the external public documents. 
 
The relationships that are shown in Figure 1 are an evolution and refinement of the previous 
Defence Needs of Australian Industry policy documents that were released beginning in 1997.12 
In the initial policy documents there was a much broader indication from government to 
industry of what capabilities the ADF would be looking for in the future. At that time the 
articulation of specific industry capabilities and the notion of taking a strategic approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
definitions and a good discussion of the issues is provided by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of 
Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 182-3. The issue is also discussed by Hall, Markowski and 
Wylie in Chapters 1 and 3 of Defence Procurement and Industry Policy: A Small Country Perspective (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
7 Australia, Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2007 (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2007), 60. 
8 Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2007, 60. 
9 Australia, Department of Defence, Defence and Industry Policy Statement 2007 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, March 2007), 1. 
10 Defence and Industry Policy Statement 2007, 2. 
11 Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan (Public Version) 2012 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, April 2012). 
12 See for example Australia, Department of Defence, Defence and Industry Strategic Policy Statement, (Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, June 1998) and Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Needs of Australian Industry 
2000, (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, June 2000). 
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defence industrial policy was a relatively new concept for Australia. The 1998 policy statement 
focused on integrating industry with the capability development process and Australian 
governments have continued throughout the last decade to improve on the connections between 
industry and the capability development process for the ADF. For example, Robert Wylie 
indicates that “Developing defence policy for Australian industry is an iterative process. The 
latest iteration, released in 2010, builds on the previous 2007 iteration’s attempt to formulate a 
strategy-led industry policy.”13   
Figure 1: The Relationship between Industry Priorities and Capability Planning
Defence 
Planning 
Guidance
Chief of Defence Force 
Preparedness Directive
Defence Capability Strategy 
and Plan
Defence Industry 
Self-Reliance Plan
Defence Capability Plan 
including
Priority Industry Capabilities 
(public document)
Classified Planning
Source: Australia. Department of Defence. Defence and Industry Policy Statement 2007 Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, March 2007  
Figure 1: The Relationship between Industry Priorities and Capability Planning 
 
Third, in addition to connecting industry with defence capability, the government has also 
connected industry requirements to the procurement process and the Defence Material 
Organisation (DMO). DMO was created in 2000 when the government of the day combined the 
capital acquisition organization and the logistics organization into a single entity. The 2000 
defence policy indicated that the creation of a single entity “will enable an effective whole-of-life 
approach to be taken to defence material and simplifies Defence’s interaction with industry.”14 
 
What is clear from reviewing the history of Australia’s approach to defence procurement and its 
defence industry is that governments have made a conscious effort over the past decade to 
ensure that there is consistency and coherence in the approach. The most recent set of policy 
documents released between 2007 and 2012 continue this approach with an intention to further 
improve the process. The issue for this study is to determine what Canada can learn from the 
Australian experience and the current set of policy documents. 
 
 
                                                          
13 Wylie, “Defence Industry Policy 2010: The Combet Iteration, 59. 
14 Australia, Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra; Defence Publishing 
Service, 2000), 105. Note that after the procurement review of 2003, the DMO became a Prescribed Agency under 
Australian Financial Management and Accountability legislation, meaning that although it remains a part of the 
defence department, it is separately accountable to the Minister for its budget and performance. 
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AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN 2012 
The current 2010 defence industrial policy, Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter 
and More Agile Defence Industrial Base, is based on the 2009 defence policy for Australia, 
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Defence White Paper 2009). Both 
of these documents make reference to the 2008 procurement and sustainment review Going to 
the Next Level: the Report of the Procurement and Sustainment Review, and the defence 
industry policy also makes reference to the strategic reform program that was launched in 
conjunction with the 2009 defence policy, The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 
2030.15  
 
The defence policy statement provides the government’s views on a number of key issues with 
respect to Australia’s defence industry. Three are particularly relevant to discussions later in this 
study. 
 
The government has indicated that  
military-off-the-shelf and commercial-off-the-shelf solutions to Defence's 
capability requirements will be the benchmark against which a rigorous cost-
benefit analysis of the military effects and schedule aspects of all proposals will 
be undertaken. Such an approach is consistent with the Defence Procurement 
and Sustainment Review.16 
 
In many respects it is the last part of the above quote that is most important – consistent with 
the ‘Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review.’ Not unlike what Canada is experiencing, 
Australia has also experienced schedule delays and cost overruns with some of its recent 
procurement projects and this has influenced how the Australian Government has articulated its 
defence policy and its defence industrial policy. 
 
The second key issue that is discussed in the defence policy is industry’s role in supporting ADF 
capability. There is a clear indication within the defence policy that the Australian Government 
wants to increase the defence industry’s ability to support the ADF. For example, the defence 
policy states “Defence will adopt procurement and industry strategies to grow local industry 
capacity and competitiveness,”17  This is to be achieved by:   
 increasing industry capacity and competitiveness through targeted productivity 
and workforce growth initiatives;  
 building greater flexibility into Defence Capability Plan reprogramming to 
mitigate the adverse capacity and capability impacts associated with large 
expenditure peaks and troughs; and  
 if necessary, increasing the amount of offshore expenditure, to a level that allows 
for a more managed, sustainable and achievable local industry growth rate.18  
 
                                                          
15
 See Australia, Department of Defence, Going to the Next Level: the Report of the Procurement and Sustainment 
Review (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2008) and Australia, Department of Defence, The Strategic Reform 
Program: Delivering Force 2030 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009). 
16 Australia, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Defence White 
Paper 2009) (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009), 127. 
17 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 127. 
18
 Ibid, 127-8. 
  
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities: Lessons for Canada from Australia 
by Criag Stone 
 
January, 2014 
Page 6 
 
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities 
Third and perhaps most important, is the commitment to ensure that “certain strategic industry 
capabilities remain resident in Australia.”19 However, the policy also indicates that Australia 
“should not pay a premium for local industry work, unless the costs and risks of doing so are 
clearly defined and justifiable in terms of strategic benefits.”20 Consequently, the government 
has decided to articulate priority industry capabilities and will intervene in the market place if 
required in order to ensure those industries remain viable. Initially, the articulation of those 
priorities was not going to be publically identified but that decision had changed by the time the 
2010 defence industrial policy was released. Their initial view was that making the list public 
“would confer an advantage on any adversary seeking to exploit critical strategic vulnerabilities, 
and would compromise commercial leverage.”21 This was changed shortly after the defence 
policy was released when Senator John Faulkner, the Minister for Defence at the time, indicated 
that the government recognized the value of the information for industry to make plans and 
investment decisions and therefore “we have decided after careful consideration of the 
commercial and national security concerns of the government, to make additional information 
about the Priority Industry Capabilities publicly available from today.”22  
 
The 2010 defence industrial policy builds on the defence policy statement and provides specific 
guidance on the Priority Industry Capabilities (PICs) and also adds Strategic Industry 
Capabilities (SICs) that it wishes to monitor. It also provides much more specific views on how it 
will approach connecting ADF capability with industry. There are a number of important issues 
that are articulated in the industrial policy and some of the policy intentions appear to be at 
odds with other policy intentions. 
  
The government has indicated that “Industry must become more resilient and self-reliant if it is 
to prosper… It can no longer expect the government to use offsets or local content quotas to help 
protect Australian defence industry from overseas competition.”23 This is also consistent with 
the most recent Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines that establish value for money as a 
core principle best achieved through competition. Competition will encourage innovation, 
improve productivity and promote efficiency. The defence industry policy also indicates that in 
order to deliver the capability requirements of the 2009 Defence White Paper, the industry will 
need to significantly increase its local capacity through investment. Caruso et al summarize the 
four principles that are underlying the policy as “(1) to set clear investment priorities; (2) to 
establish a stronger Defence-Industry relationship; (3) to seek opportunities for growth; and (4) 
to build skills, innovation and productivity.”24 The difficulty with this focus on competition and 
the desire to not use offsets is that the requirement to grow local industry and identify PICs that 
are actually achievable for Australian industry may require deliberate intervention by 
government, which is at odds with market based competition. 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 128. 
20 Ibid, 128. 
21 Ibid, 128-9. 
22 Senator John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, “Defence Capability Planning: The Way Forward for Defence – 
Industry Partnership,” Speech to the Defence + Industry Conference Adelaide, 1 July 2009. available at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/92tpl.cfm?CurrentId=9226. 
23 Building Defence Capability, 9. 
24 Holly Caruso et al., “Successful and profitable acquisition programs rely on an effective Defence Industry Policy: A 
review of the 2010 Defence Industry Policy Statement Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter and More 
Agile Defence Industry Base” (South Australian Defence Industry Leadership Program, Nov 2010), 3. See also 
Building Defence Capability, 9-10. 
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Australia’s defence industry today is “predominantly made up of 3,000 SMEs and eight 
recognised defence Primes, with only one Prime, ASC Pty Ltd, Australian owned. The defence 
industry in Australia employs around 29,000 people with SMEs accounting for 50% of 
employment in the sector.”25 This is not unlike Canada’s defence industrial base which is also 
composed of primarily small and medium sized enterprises having niche capabilities and more 
often than not with parent companies located elsewhere.26 Within the Australian manufacturing 
sector, defence industry is concentrated in shipbuilding and repair, aircraft assembly, 
modification and repair, electronics and computing, vehicles and clothing.27 Almost 80% of the 
expenditures by DMO are concentrated in the electronics, aerospace and maritime sectors as 
shown in Figure 2 below.  
Electronics Maritime Aerospace Land Wpns & Munitions
33%
4%
15%
21%
27%
Figure 2: efence Expenditu e by Sector
Source: Australia, Department of Defence, Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter and More Agile Defence Industrial 
Base (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010), 27.
 
Figure 2: Defence Expenditure by Sector 
When Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper was developed, the outlook for defence and 
industry could only be considered positive. With approximately $100B expected to be spent by 
government on replacing and maintaining defence equipment over the next 10 years, the 
outlook for local industry was positive. However, two important issues from the 2008 
procurement review are worth noting. First, the review highlighted that any analysis of market 
trends would suggest that “Australian-unique defence programs will become increasingly 
                                                          
25 Caruso et al, 2. 
26 For example, in 2004 the Canadian Defence Industries Association’s (CDIA) annual defence Almanac indicated 
that Canada’s defence industrial base was about 1500 firms with approximately 50,000 people. CDIA has now 
become CADSI and has added security industries to its association. In 2012, their website indicates that they 
represent 800 member companies and over 90,000 people. See www.defenceandsecurity.ca.  A detailed discussion on 
the Canadian defence industry is provided at Binyam Solomon, “The Defence Industrial Base in Canada,” Chapter 6 in 
The Public Management of Defence in Canada Edited by Craig Stone, 111-139 (Toronto: Breakout Education 
Network, 2009). 
27 Building Defence Capability, 27. 
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uneconomic in the future” and that “While Defence demand is high in dollar terms, the volume 
of units required by the ADF is unlikely to lead to efficient manufacture.”28 In essence, this 
implies that Australia, like Canada, will have to explore ways to combine its demand with that of 
its allies to achieve economies of scale, particularly for major weapons systems like the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter. 
 
Second, the 2008 procurement review also noted that Australia needed to “take advantage of 
acquisition opportunities, including off-the-shelf purchases and international programs, to 
contain costs and free-up local industry capacity for priority tasks.”29 This actually supports the 
plan to provide a list of PICs, but the challenge facing the Australian Government is to find the 
correct balance between growing priority industries that are compatible with the defence 
capability requirements of the ADF while also remaining consistent with the recommendations 
of the most recent procurement and sustainment review. Of particular interest with respect to 
the emphasis on purchasing off-the-shelf is Caruso et al’s observation that  
The success associated with the introduction of the C-17 Globemaster transport 
aircraft and Super Hornet fighter aircraft, schedule slippages and cost overruns 
attributable to extensive Australianisation of previously introduced capability, 
and the strength of the Australian dollar increases the incentive for buying 
COTS/MOTS [commercial off-the-shelf/military off-the-shelf] offshore, and 
decreases the focus on manufacturing locally.30 
 
The 2010 defence industry policy builds on the 2007 policy and provides a much clearer 
articulation of the role of PICs, (See Annex A for the list of the twelve PICs related areas). PICs 
are defined in the 2009 defence policy statement as “those industry capabilities which would 
confer an essential strategic advantage by being resident within Australia, and which, if not 
available, would significantly undermine defence self-reliance and ADF operational capability.”31 
The intention is that these PICs will be reviewed regularly as part of the development of the 
annual defence planning guidance, the main defence planning document for the ADF between 
White Papers.  
 
It is this connection to the annual planning guidance that provides Australia the ability to 
connect defence industrial policy with defence policy and ADF capability requirements. It also 
allows the procurement process to be connected to the industrial policy priorities because 
solutions to defence capability requirements are managed through the procurement process, 
both acquisitions and sustainment. This is consistent with the 2008 procurement and 
sustainment review’s recommendation that “[D]efence should prepare an annual submission 
detailing current and future capability gaps and the priority for their remediation for 
government consideration and approval.”32 
 
The 2008 procurement and sustainment review also recommended that the public capability 
plan contain enough information with respect to project scope and timings that industry would 
be able to develop strategic business plans. Again the consistency across policy documents is 
apparent when both the defence policy and the defence industry policy indicate that industry 
                                                          
28 Going to the Next Level, 40. 
29 Ibid, 40. 
30 Caruso et al, 4. 
31 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 128. 
32 Going to the Next Level, xi and 6. 
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will be advised of any changes to the priority areas through the public version of the Defence 
Capability Plan. 
 
The actual 2012 public version of the defence capability plan is structured so that each 
equipment acquisition proposal over the decade to 2021 is presented in a common format: 
Background, Australian Industry Capability Considerations, Phase Scope, Planned Schedule, 
Australian Industry Opportunities, and Point of Contact. The two specific references to industry 
are further described as: 
Australian Industry Capability Considerations provides an indication of the 
Australian Industry Capability (AIC), Priority Industry Capabilities (PIC), 
Strategic Industry Capabilities (SIC), and Global Supply Chain (GSC) potential 
for each phase of the project in tabular format. Further detail on the AIC, PIC, 
and SIC aspects is generally provided under the Australian Industry 
Opportunities section of the project phase entry. 
 
Australian Industry Opportunities identify potential opportunities for Australian 
industry involvement in the acquisition and through-life support stages of the 
proposal, and in related infrastructure aspects.33 
 
The Defence Capability Plan also provides additional information about industry opportunities. 
This is really designed to emphasize the government’s expectation that defence will “ensure best 
value for money outcomes in Defence spending, based on open and effective competition.” and 
that “consistent with the principles of value for money and the need to consider OTS solutions, 
government policy is to ensure that as much of the Defence budget is spent in Australia as is 
reasonably practicable.”34 In essence, Australia wants to use its industry capabilities policy to 
“maximise opportunities for Australian industry to participate in the delivery of the acquisition 
and sustainment of ADF capability and to achieve the required strategic industry capability 
outcomes where this represents value for money.”35 
 
Discussions with Australian officials about trying to find the balance between using the market 
and off-the-shelf (OTS) solutions and ensuring that the Australian industry can support the PICs 
indicate that they are aware of the issue. Australia’s approach is to provide support around a 
number of alternative industry support programs. For example, the Australian Industry 
Capability (AIC) program seeks to ensure that whenever Australian industry can competitively 
provide input into equipment purchased from overseas that industry players should be given the 
opportunity to at least bid for the work. More specifically, “under the AIC program, all bids for 
Defence projects valued above $50M or with a PIC implication must include an AIC plan to 
examine participation by Australian Industry on a value for money basis.”36 Although the 
threshold is now $AUD 20M, the threshold value is less important than the requirement for 
                                                          
33 Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan (Public Version) 2012 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, April 2012), 5. 
34 Defence Capability Plan, 6. 
35 Defence Capability Plan, 6. This is also consistent with the literature around defence procurement and defence 
industry and with the actual practice of most nations.  See Peter Hall, Stefan Markowski and Robert Wylie, 
“Government Policy: Defence Procurement and Defence Industry,” Chapter 5 in Defence Procurement and Industry 
Policy: A Small Country Perspective, edited by Stefan Markowski, Peter Hall, and Robert Wylie (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 160-161. 
36 Building Defence Capability,73. As indicated in this quote the original threshold was A$50M but discussions with 
DMO staff indicate that the threshold has now been lowered to A$20M. 
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bidding competitively because the AIC program does not support paying a price premium just to 
have Australian industry participate.37 What lowering the threshold does accomplish is that it 
allows a greater number of small and medium size enterprises to be part of the process. 
 
A second policy approach is to provide assistance to industry in order to increase their 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Using a series of grant programs covering industry 
workforce skilling, innovation, and export market development, the intention is that all 
industries will have the potential to fully exploit the business opportunities that remain in an 
off-the shelf procurement environment. In addition it is hoped that increasing industry 
competitiveness will also help diversify the defence areas of their businesses in order to build the 
overall size of the Australian defence industry through exports where the opportunity arises. 
This should in the longer term overcome any increased market volatility which an off-the-shelf 
procurement strategy produces. 
 
The third policy approach is the PICs program. As indicated above, PICs are supposed to 
provide a strategic advantage for the ADF. Consequently, Australia has identified the domestic 
industry capabilities most needed to support the ADF. While many, or even most, of these 
capabilities relate to the ability to sustain overseas produced equipment, a substantial portion of 
the PICs cover the capacity for domestic equipment manufacture. The intention is to ensure that 
Australian industry can support the demands of the ADF within a specified capability range.  
 
The establishment of the current set of PICs and getting agreement on what they actually are has 
its roots with the Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation (RPDE) program that was 
established in 2005. Rapid, as the RPDE is commonly referred to, “was created in 2005 as a 
collaborative arrangement between Defence, Industry and Academia, to solve difficult and 
complex Defence capability challenges, in an innovative and collegiate environment.”38 In 2008, 
a workshop was conducted to identify and develop priority industry capabilities. The initial 
results were analyzed and additional workshops and senior level working groups were held to 
challenge assumptions, identify gaps in capabilities and come to an agreement on the list that 
was published in the 2010 defence industry policy (provided at Annex A). The list is focused on 
capabilities and not companies and there appears to be general agreement on the list by all 
parties.39 
 
Although the final decision on what becomes a PIC ultimately rests with the ADF, all the players 
have agreed on the current list albeit with some concerns that will be discussed later. Moving 
forward PICs will be reviewed on a regular basis to confirm the health of the industrial sector 
supporting a particular capability area and action will be taken as required if there are problems. 
Determining the health of a particular capability area will be based on a set of evaluation criteria 
that are provided in Table 1 below: 
 
                                                          
37 The material in the next few paragraphs is based on email discussions with Australian government officials in the 
DMO the week of 23 July 2012. 
38 RPDE Review, April 2012, 2. 
39 Based on discussions with DMO staff the issue of industry support was specifically discussed and they noted that 
industry has not challenged the validity of the list. This is not to say that individual companies might disagree with 
specific areas but in the broader context the process was inclusive, included industry participation in development 
and is an improvement over past practice. 
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Evaluation Criteria Questions to be asked/answered 
Essential to operational and 
military requirements 
Can the ADF conduct its operation without the industry 
capability?  
Is there a work-around if the industry capability is not 
available in Australia? 
Discretion in capability 
development 
Does the industry capability need to be in the country?  
Is it unique to Australia?  
Is it specific to Defence? 
Critical information and 
technology sharing 
Is the industry capability operationally strategic? 
Is it uniquely Australian? 
Does it provide access to the required overseas 
technology? 
Comparative trade advantage 
and leverage 
Is the capability leading edge and sought by allies? 
Will it increase Australian leverage internationally? 
Significant risk to 
international supply 
Is the capability in decline or is its supply at risk?  
Can the capability be stockpiled? 
Is their sufficient rate of effort in Australia to maintain 
critical mass of capability? 
Regeneration difficulty Can the industry capability be regenerated in time to 
cover ADF needs in a credible contingency? 
Can it be regenerated cost effectively if in decline or 
lost? 
Affordability, effectiveness 
and efficiency 
Can the PIC be acquired or maintained affordably? 
Will aggregation of similar PICs lead to a viable base of 
business thereby adding to affordability? 
Is Defence influential in shaping the relevant market? 
 
Table 1: Priority Industry Capability Evaluation Criteria40 
If during a review of the PICs it is revealed that the ADF will require more than industry can 
supply, the government is prepared to intervene to ensure that domestic supply occurs. To 
achieve this, the government would need to reschedule its acquisition projects in order to 
provide companies with the continuity of workload they need to maintain core expertise in the 
longer term. The government would also, in specific cases, consider providing assistance in 
terms of including the payment of a price premium to sustain domestic manufacturing. The 
DMO conducted individual ‘Health Checks’ for 6 of the 12 PICs in 2011 and early 2012 and will 
                                                          
40 Australia, Department of Material Organization Staff, August 2012. 
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release information on the remaining 6 as assessments are completed. All of the health checks 
have concluded that “Detailed analysis demonstrates the current health of the insert the PIC to 
be satisfactory” or words to that effect. This statement is then followed by an indication that the 
government will continue to monitor the PIC. Depending on the PIC, there may also be an 
indication of possible longer term concerns and an indication of what might be considered 
moving forward to ensure the specific industry remains able to support the ADF. 
 
As indicated earlier, there are a number of different programs that vary in size and scope to help 
industry and the ADF. The Australian Industry Capability program discussed above is but one of 
a number of programs. All of these programs are discussed in detail in the 2010 defence 
industry policy including specific annexes that provide a summary of funding, intentions and 
main features.41 A few of the more prominent programs are highlighted here to demonstrate the 
variety of issues being covered within the policy statement. 
 
Perhaps the most important program in terms of the PICs discussion is the actual PICs 
innovation program which is designed to encourage industry to submit innovative proposals in 
one of the PICs areas. Defence will match funding by industry up to $4M towards development 
of the capability. The Skilling Australia’s Defence Industry (SADI) is focused on workforce skill 
sets. If a particular defence industry is having difficulty finding qualified individuals SADI 
provides a mechanism to help that industry provide the required training and education in order 
to be successful and competitive.42 The Global Supply Chain program is designed to help 
Australian industry get involved in global supply chains. The program provides a mechanism for 
“primes and OEMs to develop company specific programs to evaluate Australian suppliers for 
participation in their global supply chain.”43 The Defence Export Unit was created in 2007 to 
promote Australian defence industry overseas. It includes senior military officers who act as 
advocates and help open doors with foreign governments. The Capability Technology 
Demonstrator was established to allow industry to demonstrate how advanced technologies can 
enhance ADF capabilities. It is designed to help smaller companies bridge the gap between 
technology development and the commercialization/manufacture of leading edge technologies. 
 
Each of these programs has been provided funding for a specific period of time. What will 
remain to be seen is whether or not the government of the day continues the programs after the 
funding has expired or whether they will develop different initiatives. However, the time 
constraint for funding may limit or constrain some industry participation because of their desire 
for consistency and long term commitment. As well, the variety and number of different 
programs will be a challenge to coordinate and manage over time to ensure that there is no 
overlap, duplication and more importantly, opportunities missed.44 This will require dedicated 
effort at the most senior levels to ensure someone has a broad holistic perspective and 
awareness of what is happening across and within departments and across industry. 
Government bureaucracies in the Westminster system of government like that found in Canada 
                                                          
41 Building Defence Capability. See for example Annex D which covers those programs designed to provide 
opportunities for growth of Australian Industry or Annex E which is focused on those programs designed to build 
skills and foster innovation. 
42 Ibid, 76-7. 
43 Ibid, 74. 
44 Discussions with DMO staff indicate that there is a significant amount of coordination involved in order to 
implement PICs in practice. This is particularly true with respect to ensuring alignment of practices and consistency 
of monitoring. This could actually be more time consuming and difficult than the actual process of identifying the 
PICs. 
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and Australia are historically not good at this level of coordination because of the vertical 
structures and accountabilities that exist. 
 
Returning to the discussion about the defence capability plan and the issue of OTS purchasing, it 
seems clear that Australia has not sought to react to, or remedy, all of the industrial effects of an 
inexorable shift towards off-the-shelf procurement but has focused more on mitigating against 
some of the more damaging or disruptive aspects of this kind of purchasing. The important issue 
for Australian industry to acknowledge is that it appears that the Australian Government is 
prepared to accept changes in the size and composition of the defence industry including some 
diminution in overall industry capability. Although the intention is not to reduce the size of 
Australian industry, and the policy approaches discussed above are intended to help avoid a 
reduction, the real challenge is determining what industry capabilities have the highest strategic 
value and how best to intervene to deal with those with sustainability problems. This will require 
open and honest discussions between government, the ADF and industry, something that is not 
necessarily viewed the same way by government and industry.  
 
The friction point in this context is how the government views its relationship with industry. Is 
the relationship confrontational or considered a partnership in the process to define 
requirements and acquire military capabilities? If the government view is framed around the 
notion that industry is only looking for profit and wants the buyer to take all the risk, that is 
confrontational and what is shared with industry will not be as open and honest as would be 
possible if industry was viewed as a partner. This notion of perspective is supported by the 
Australian Business Defence Industry Unit’s response to a preliminary report on procurement 
procedures where in the context of early engagement during the needs definition stage they note 
“Without adequate IP protection proposed early engagement will be treated with suspicion by 
industry”.45  Although industry continues to be frustrated with the lack of clarity and decision 
making about procurement decisions, it nevertheless appears that there is a sufficient level of 
openness and discussion in Australia’s case that industry is generally supportive of the direction 
the government is moving. However, recent budget and fiscal challenges may change this as 
procurement projects are delayed in order to meet budget reduction targets. Most governments 
are facing similar challenges and the reality is that in periods of constraint policy documents and 
stated intentions issued prior to the fiscal crisis become meaningless for industry.  Industry 
needs clarity of intent from the government. 
 
In addition to the PICs, there is also an intention to monitor an additional 12 strategic industry 
capabilities (SICs) because they might become priority areas. SICs are defined as those 
capabilities that “provide Australia with enhanced defence self-reliance, ADF operational 
capability, or longer term procurement certainty.”46 The list of SICs is provided after the PICs at 
Annex A. 
 
At this point in time it is possible to conclude that the strength of the Australian approach to 
connecting its industrial policy to procurement lies with the coherence and consistency that has 
been achieved with a variety of policy documents that are designed for separate but 
interconnected purposes. What has been described above implies that everything is working well 
                                                          
45 Australian Business Defence Industry Unit. “Response To The Preliminary Report Into Procurement Procedures 
For Defence Capital Projects.” Letter to Senator Eggleston, Chair, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee, 28 February 2012. 
46 Building Defence Capability, 41. 
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and the government of the day is improving the process iteratively on an annual basis through 
planning guidance, capability plans and procurement reviews and discussions with industry as 
required. However, the reality is that there are some others who do not share the same level of 
confidence as government. Industry has its views on the policy documents and process as do 
others outside of government. The next section will address some of the more important 
concerns in order to prepare the groundwork for a discussion on what lessons Canada can draw 
from the Australian experience. 
 
AREAS OF CONCERN 
 
Impact of Priority Industrial capabilities 
One of the first issues in the defence industry policy that must be acknowledged is that PICs 
provide legitimacy for government intervention if the market fails to provide strategically 
important capabilities. The difficulty is that PICs are not the focus of defence business. As 
Robert Wylie argues, PICs are only 6-7 % of annual expenditures on acquisition and support and 
the majority of defence business will be competed on a standard value for money basis.47 This is 
supported by Minister Combet’s speech at the 2009 annual defence and industry conference 
where he indicated that the PICs represented approximately $700M while the entire DMO 
budget was $10.9B.48 Minister Combet’s intent was to highlight that there would be sufficient 
demand to sustain the industries connected to the PICs. This is at odds with the point being 
made by Wylie.  
 
Foreign Ownership 
A related concern raised by Wylie deals with the identification of PICs and that the government 
has not actually provided enough guidance on how they would manage the risk associated with a 
foreign supplier should that supplier decide to withhold or limit availability for political reasons. 
Caruso et al expand on Wylie’s observation by providing an example where a foreign company 
with very little presence in Australia was awarded a contract for an acoustic technology 
identified as a PICs rather than another supplier who had made a substantial research and 
development investment in Australia.49 It is important to note that the PICs are focused on 
industry capabilities and not specific companies so it is quite possible for a capability to be 
provided by an Australian based company with a foreign parent. Despite the appearance 
articulated above that everyone was in agreement on the PICs, there remain areas, from an 
industry perspective, that require improvement in implementation. 
 
The issue of foreign ownership is also connected to the broader issue of how much actual 
capability should the defence industry be providing to the nation. For example, the trend in 
many western nations over the past decade has been to increase the amount of civilian 
contractor support for military operations. Australia is no different and is now in a position 
where industry is operating the strategic communications facilities. In this case industry is 
actually providing a capability and sustaining that capability. The policy issue here is related to 
risk and how much dependence the ADF has on industry to provide required military capability 
for conducting operations. 
                                                          
47 Robert Wylie, “Supplying and Supporting Force 2030: Defence Policy for Australian Industry,” Security Challenges 
5, no.2 (Winter 2009): 118. 
48 Greg Combet, “Force 2030: Government and Industry” Address to the Defence and Industry Conference, Adelaide, 
1 July 2009 
49 Caruso et al, 6. 
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The use of industry to provide military capability is not unique in today’s complex security 
environment. Canada has contracted its basic pilot training to industry and contracted a large 
part of its logistical support at the base camp in Kandahar to industry. Other nations have 
adopted similar approaches and solutions to sustain their militaries. For many, this shift to 
industry providing more direct support is all about achieving savings so that limited funds can 
be dedicated to more important requirements and Australia has embarked on similar efforts. 
For example, the Defence Strategic Reform Program contains a number of initiatives designed 
to make the DMO operate in a more business like fashion, particularly in how it develops 
incentives that encourage industry to implement ongoing productivity improvements. This is 
just one of a number of initiatives that are based on recommendations from the 2008 
procurement and sustainment review and are designed to provide $5.1 B in savings over 4 
years.50 Within DMO most of the initiatives are connected to enhancing productivity through 
initiatives like reducing inventories, adopting commercial practices for improving maintenance 
processes and using better incentive arrangements to increase productivity.51 However, in the 
broader context of the Strategic Reform Program, the intention is to improve the linkage 
between policy development, force planning, the development of capability requirements and 
the subsequent acquisition of those capability requirements.  
 
Practicing the Policy 
Another area of concern that has been articulated by Ben White is that the “defence industry’s 
contribution to ADF capability appears vastly understated in the White Paper.”52 He cites the 
lack of offset policies and a perceived lack of investment in local industry capability in the past 
as a concern. In essence White is looking at past action by government and indicates that this 
brings into question the government’s actual commitment to a viable defence industry in 
Australia. He goes on to note that “in providing a sustainable defence capability, industry will 
need to be seen as a vital capability partner” and that “lengthy acquisition lead times and the 
long in-service life cycle of major Defence platforms means planning for a sustainable defence 
capability – with industry the primary source for its innovations – must occur now.”53  White’s 
observation is supported by the example provided in Caruso et al where a company that had 
invested heavily in research and development within Australia towards a PIC related system lost 
to an outside contender who had not invested in Australia. 
 
Lack of Specific Guidance for Industry 
Australian industry has also articulated a number of concerns about the latest defence industry 
policy. Although they are generally supportive of the approach, the Australian Business Defence 
Industry Unit has articulated concerns in four specific areas. First, in relation to the articulation 
of PICs and SICs they note that they are “too broad and Government funding for the new 
projects and sustainment work in these areas too uncertain to give industry the guidance or 
                                                          
50 Australia, Department of Defence, The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030 (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, April 2009), 15. 
51 The Strategic Reform Program is about improving accountability, improving defence planning and enhancing 
defence productivity and has 15 separate reform streams that will be implemented over the next three to five years. 
These include: Capability Development; the Defence Estate; Information and Communications Technology; 
Intelligence; Smart Maintenance; Inventory; Procurement and Sustainment; Logistics; Non-Equipment 
Procurement; Preparedness, Personnel and Operating Costs; Reserves; Science and Technology; Output Focused 
Budget Model; Strategic Planning; and Workforce and Shared Services. 
52 Ben White, “Sustainable Defence Capability: Australia’s national security and the role of defence industry.” 
Australian Defence Force Journal no. 183 (2010): 90. 
53 White, 90. 
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confidence required to invest.”54 Industry will need to have more clarity on how investments in 
PIC and SIC areas will be promoted and argue that “a public commitment to regular tranches of 
new Defence projects and sustainment work for PICs and SICs would be a start to giving 
industry the confidence to invest in these priority capabilities.”55 
 
Need for Longer Term Certainty 
The second area of concern dealt with future capital acquisitions and the articulation of 
requirements into the future. Industry expressed concern over the ability to actually grow 
industry’s capabilities because most of the projects identified to be modernized or replaced in 
the current procurement cycle were already set in place. From their perspective, industry needs 
to know what will be required beyond the next decade if it is to grow the necessary workforce 
skills needed to meet future requirements. Industry argues that “[W]ithout regular tranches of 
new defence projects or long-term sustainment contracts, resources will continue to leave 
defence industry for other sectors.”56 The obvious risk to the ADF is that industry resources will 
be committed to other work and will not be available for defence when it is needed. 
 
The third area of concern deals with the provision of reliable defence information. This is really 
a continuation of the previous concern but is more generalized across all of the ADF’s plans and 
not just capital acquisition. Industry argues that it needs reliable and dependable information in 
order to make investment decisions. The implication is that this has not happened in the past or 
that as a general comment, it could be improved upon moving forward. Industry is looking for 
more certainty and longer term commitments by government for defence projects and 
sustainment work. 
 
Creating a Real Partnership 
The fourth area deals with the notion of creating a real defence and industry partnership and the 
need to get industry involved early in the procurement process. Industry notes that the focus by 
the government on “Value for Money and market-based competition in key capability areas 
means industry gets involved too late to bring the best and most cost-effective solution to the 
table.”57 Not surprisingly, industry’s view is that if they are engaged earlier the level of risk can 
be reduced without ignoring the requirement of value for money and competition. Industry 
argues that “Early industry engagement in this first 20% can help clarify project feasibility, 
emerging technologies and robust cost estimates and allow industry to align business 
investment with Defence’s plans.”58 This view requires some caution because industry has also 
stated, as noted earlier, that early involvement with the needs definition stage must be done 
carefully to avoid suspicion with respect to intellectual property protection. A related but 
separate issue is the time it takes to actually complete the contracting process. A recent Defense 
News article by Nigel Pittaway quotes Graham Priestnall, the President of the Australian 
Industry and Defence Network, by indicating “You can’t have a situation where it takes the 
preferred tenderer nine months to get into contract – that’s ridiculous.”59 
                                                          
54 Australian Business Defence Industry Unit, “Defence Industry Policy Priorities 2011”, 1; available at 
http://www.nswbusinesschamber.com.au/NSWBC/media/Misc/DIU%20documents/Australian-Business-Defence-
Industry-Policy-Priorites-2011.pdf; accessed 17 Jul 2012. 
55 Ibid Unit, 1. 
56 Ibid Unit, 1. 
57 Ibid Unit, 3. 
58 Ibid Unit, 3. 
59 Priestnall, Graham. Quoted in Nigel Pittaway, “Australian Defense Minister Seeks Better Relations With Industry,” 
Defense News 27 Nov 2013; internet; http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2013311270021. 
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Increased Dependence on Foreign Supply 
In addition to the four areas discussed above, the Caruso et al study provides the results of a 
survey of South Australian Defence Industries on their attitude towards defence and the 2010 
industry policy. Perhaps the most significant observation made to the team was with respect to 
the increasing dependence on foreign supply with one of the respondents stating: 
While the strength of Australian Industry has been smart sustainment, the 
continued overseas acquisition of platforms will, over time, reduce the capability 
of Australian industry to sustain these capabilities. The front end engineering 
capabilities developed in acquisitions and developmental projects will be lost, 
leading to the loss of these skills required to sustain the platforms later.60 
 
The Caruso et al study made seven recommendations based on the results of their survey with 
industry. These are: 
 Clarify the government’s intentions with respect to PICs. The government should clearly 
define the link between required capabilities and industry priorities to provide greater 
certainty to industry its [sic] investment decisions. 
 Audit the defence industry’s capabilities. Perform an assessment of the health of the 
supplier base in order to identify industry capability gaps. The gaps would inform future 
government action to obtain the required capabilities and capacities. 
 Improve Investment in PICs. The government should contract industry directly to 
provide the desired level or expertise and industrial capacity for priority capabilities.  
 Ensure contracting arrangements between Primes and SMEs are appropriate. 
Depending upon the risk inherent with each acquisition, Prime contracts should contain 
provisions to ensure that appropriate commercial terms are flowed down to 
subcontractors and SMEs to minimize complexity and compliance costs. 
 Develop Improved Opportunities for SMEs. Defence should take a more active role in 
developing the SMEs and implement strategy to help drive efficiencies, to lower costs 
and make local industry more competitive.  
 Improve the R&D funding model. To maximize the government’s return on R&D funding 
to industry, programs such as the Capability and Technology Demonstrator program 
need to be made more accountable. 
 Conduct a defence industry attitudinal survey annually. To improve the development of 
the DIPS for future releases, there needs to be a feedback mechanism to capture 
industry’s attitudes to the Defence relationship and the business impact of the DIPS.61 
 
These recommendations and the concerns articulated by Australian industry could be part of a 
discussion with Canadian industry about Canada’s procurement process and its approach to 
supporting the defence industrial sector. The Canadian Association of Defence and Security 
Industries’ (CADSI) priorities for 2011 reflects a similar set of concerns and the study conducted 
by CADSI for Ministers in the fall of 2009 contained recommendations very similar to what has 
been articulated in Australia.62  
 
                                                          
60 Caruso et al., 5 
61 Ibid, 16. 
62 See Canadian Association of Defence Security Industries, CADSI Policy Priorities 2011, (Ottawa, CADSI, 2011); 
available at https://www.defenceandsecurity.ca/UserFiles/File/2011/CADSIPolicyPriorities11.pdf 
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More recently, a 2012 study on the Aerospace sector by the Honourable David Emerson entitled 
Beyond the Horizon: Canada’s Interest and Future in Aerospace and a 2013 study by Tom 
Jenkins entitled Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial 
Capabilities reflect similar concerns.63 The reality is industry wants clarity and consistency over 
time, something that is difficult to do in most democracies. Australia is making an attempt to 
provide the consistency and clarity desired by industry and others. The connection of defence 
policy, defence industry policy, defence planning guidance and procurement reform with ADF 
capability requirements is a significant move in the right direction. Despite the concerns 
discussed above, the consistency in these documents reflects an intention to provide a coherent 
and connected set of policies and guidance to all concerned. Determining appropriate lessons 
for Canada begins with connecting the Australian experience with the most recent studies by 
Jenkins, Emerson and CADSI. 
 
LESSONS FOR CANADA 
Although it is not intended to review all of the recent Canadian literature on the defence 
industry and procurement, it is important to understand that Canada is at an important 
juncture.  The Conservative government issued the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) in 
2008 which included an articulation of consistent 2% nominal growth in the defence budget 
from 2011-12 until 2028 combined with an intention to replace most of the core equipment 
platforms.64  Since 2008, and the release of CFDS, there have been a series of perceived 
procurement failures and the recent reports by Emerson and Jenkins are related to this issue.  
 
Recommendation 2 of the Emerson report on the Aerospace sector dealt with developing a list of 
aerospace technology priorities while recommendations 13 and 14 dealt with establishing 
“earlier, clearer, firmer commitments on industrial and technological benefits” and developing 
“a partnership approach to in-service support”.65 The Jenkin’s report identified six key 
industrial capability clusters that could be used to inform pending decisions followed by “a 
regular and more robust review, initially within the next four years, to validate or amend the 
initial selection based on experience and better data and analysis.”66  The initial clusters listed in 
the Jenkins report are: 
                                                          
63 See Emerson, The Honourable David, Beyond the Horizon: Canada’s Interests and Future and Aerospace Volume 
1, Aerospace Review Mandated by the Government of Canada (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, November 2012); and Tom Jenkins, Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key 
Industrial Capabilities Report of the Special Advisor to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada; February 2013).  The Honourable David Emerson was the 
Canadian Minister of Industry from 2004 to 2006, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Pacific 
Gateway and the Vancouver-Whistler Olympics from 2006 to 2008 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2008. Tom 
Jenkins is the Executive Chairman and Chief Strategy Officer of Open Text Corporation, the largest independent 
software company in Canada and chaired the Expert Review Panel on Federal Support for Research and 
Development in 2012. 
64 See Canada, DND, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa; DND).  Over time this amounts to 490 $B.  Although 
this sounds like a significant amount of money, the growth in defence spending does not keep pace with the long term 
average growth of the Canadian economy.  That would imply, all things being equal, that the burden on Canadian 
society to fund defence would fall from approximately 1.2% of GDP in 2013 to approximately 0.8% of GDP in 2028 
should the Canadian economy grow at its longer term average of between 2 and 3%. This is not to argue that defence 
should be funded as a percentage of GDP but rather to make the point that $490B over 20 years is not that 
significant. In the more technical context, the reader should note that the defence budget was already increasing a 
1.5% to allow for inflation so the actual increase is only 0.5% above the original intended funding line prior to the 
release of CFDS. 
65 See Beyond the Horizon, 32-33 and 51-53. 
66 Jenkins, xiv. 
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 Arctic and Maritime Security 
 Protecting the Soldier 
 Command and Support 
 Cyber-Security 
 Training Systems 
 In Service Support67 
 
These clusters are not as specific as those developed in Australia but the longer term intention if 
the government implements the Jenkins’ and Emerson’s recommendations would be to provide 
additional fidelity to these clusters.  What prevents that fidelity at the moment is the lack of 
adequate data to support further refinement.  Canada does not have the analytical data nor has 
it engaged with industry in a way that Australia has in order to develop a more refined list. 
Despite some of the concerns expressed by Australian industry, it remains prudent to take any 
appropriate lessons from the Australian experience as Canada moves forward with its own 
refinement.  
 
Lesson 1 
There is a significant amount of coordination and effort required to connect a defence 
industrial policy with defence capability requirements and future procurement requirements 
to meet those capability requirements. 
 
The most important lesson for Canada when it examines the Australian approach to defence 
industry policy is to look at the amount of effort that has been dedicated to connecting a series of 
related policy documents that provides industry and others with an articulation of what the 
government of the day intends to do and what their priorities are moving forward. For Australia, 
this includes a defence policy white paper, a defence industrial policy, a public defence 
capability plan, published results of two separate but related procurement reviews and a 
published strategic reform program. The main strength that comes out of this effort is that 
industry has a “comprehensive catalogue and description of the range of practical, funded 
programs in place to foster the development of the Australian defence industry base.”68  
 
In contrast, Canada has generally avoided publishing ‘White Papers’ and has not formally 
examined industrial policy since the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada in the early 1980s.69 This is not to say that Canadian 
governments have not had an industrial policy but rather to make the point that they have not 
articulated that policy in a single document. Those looking for a policy need to examine speeches 
by the Prime Minister, speeches by other Ministers, Throne Speeches, Budget documents, the 
Hansard or Press Releases in order to piece together what the policy might be. To be fair, there 
is a National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy, a National Aerospace and Defence 
Strategic Framework and an Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy. Individual policies like 
these are useful but do not provide the same level of coherence as that found in Australia. A 
                                                          
67 Ibid, XV. 
68 Wylie, Defence Industry Policy 2010, 59 
69 As part of that Commission, D.G. McFetridge completed a separate research study entitled Canadian Industrial 
Policy in Action.   See D.G. McFetridge, Canadian Industrial Policy in Action, Volume 4 of the Research Studies 
Prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985).  See also Craig Stone, “Canada Needs a Defence Industrial Policy,” International 
Journal 63, No. 2 (Spring 2008):344-357. 
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coherent defence industrial policy would be useful and is desired by Canada’s defence industry. 
The requirement to establish and implement a defence industrial policy was the first 
recommendation from the December 2009 CADSI report to the government.70 
 
In Canada’s case it would likely require some additional coordination beyond what Australia has 
experienced. Canada would need to include the broader North American Defence Industrial 
Base as part of its deliberations and provincial considerations and dynamics would need to be 
addressed. More broadly, the significant amount of coordination and work associated with 
making these policy document connections will not guarantee immediate results. Australia has 
been connecting these types of documents for a couple of decades and is only now getting to the 
stage where there is some degree of alignment, support and trust with industry. In addition, 
there should be no expectation of a perfect solution. Regardless of how aligned government is 
with industry there will always be friction because there will ultimately be winners and losers. 
Industry is in business to provide profits for owners and shareholders while government, in this 
context, is about providing the most effective defence capability possible based on a constrained 
budget.  
 
For Canada, this would be a long term initiative that would develop incrementally and iteratively 
over time. It will require consistency, engagement and a degree of trust from all participants. In 
addition, government employees involved in this effort will need to have a better understanding 
of industry and its requirements if there is to be any chance of developing policies that are 
agreeable to all sides. 
 
Lesson 2 
Developing a list of Priority Industry Capabilities is a worthwhile endeavour. 
 
Related to the issue of policy documents, the development and articulation of priority industrial 
capabilities has been viewed as a positive step by Australian Industry. Despite some of the 
concerns that were discussed earlier, the general view is that it is beneficial for industry when 
combined with the ADF’s capability requirements. It allows industry to make longer term 
investment and workforce decisions with some degree of confidence. Developing a similar list in 
Canada could provide similar benefits. The word could is utilized here because there is no 
empirical evidence yet to indicate that Australian Industry is better (or worse) off with the most 
recent development of PICs. Early indications from the literature and discussions with DMO 
staff indicate that industry supports the initiative and that the first round of Health Checks 
appears to be positive. But, as discussed above, Australian industry continues to have some 
concerns with the Australian Government’s actual application. 
 
For example, if the government is not consistent in how it implements and conducts initiatives 
like the AIC, it may be very difficult to determine whether or not an industry is better off with or 
without the programme. As discussed earlier, the concerns raised by White and Caruso et al with 
respect to selecting foreign companies without significant investment in Australia over those 
with significant investment is interpreted by industry as being inconsistent with the articulated 
                                                          
70 See CADSI, Canada’s Defence Industry: A Vital Partner Supporting Canada’s Economic and National Interests: 
Industry Engagement on the Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Defence Industry and Military Procurement 
(Ottawa: CADSI, December 2009), vii.  The need for a defence industrial policy was also articulated in Stone, Craig. 
“Canada Needs a Defence Industrial Strategy.” International Journal 63, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 341-357. 
  
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities: Lessons for Canada from Australia 
by Criag Stone 
 
January, 2014 
Page 21 
 
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities 
policy. If the policy is not implemented consistently over time, any empirical evidence will be 
open to challenge. 
 
Nevertheless, developing such a priority list would be consistent with the government’s existing 
approach of establishing Canada Research Chairs in particular sectors of the economy and the 
recent Expert Panel Report, Innovation Canada: A Call to Action. The Innovation Canada 
report calls for Canada to make business innovation a core objective of public procurement 
while the Canada Excellence Research Chairs program announced with the 2008 budget is 
designed to promote innovation and leading edge research in areas of strategic importance to 
Canada based on the Government’s Science and Technology Strategy. The government’s four 
priority areas are: environmental sciences and technologies; natural resources and energy; 
health and related life sciences and technologies; and information and communications 
technologies.71 Within each of these areas there is scope to combine the intentions of the 
Innovation Canada recommendation on public procurement with the government’s priority 
research areas and future defence procurement requirements. It would also be consistent with 
the recommendation in the Jenkins report that recommends six key industry clusters that can 
“balance Canada’s short-term practical needs with the long-term goal of high value-added 
participation in global markets."72  
 
Lesson 3 
There are benefits to conducting a broad based procurement review. 
 
The next area that Canada can leverage from the Australian experience is more specific to the 
relationship between industry and procurement. Australia has conducted two procurement 
reviews in less than a decade. Both reviews provided the government with substantial 
recommendations on what needed to be done to improve the procurement process and how that 
should be done. Australia has a single procurement organization as does the United Kingdom 
and many of Canada’s traditional Allies. From an accountability perspective Canada has one 
department legally by Act of Parliament responsible for procurement (the Defence Production 
Act indicates it is the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC)) but 
three main departments are involved in the process. It is in this area that improvement is 
required within the overall procurement process. Related to this issue is the acknowledgement 
that the Ministers of Industry, National Defence and Public Works asked CADSI to look at 
Canada’s procurement system in the fall of 2009. The report was done with an industry focus 
and while many of the recommendations in the report are valid and worthwhile, there is a 
requirement to look more broadly at the procurement system in its entirety.  
 
For example, there is no formal requirement for Canada to compete defence acquisition projects 
internationally. Both the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement of Government 
Procurement (AGP) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have exemptions 
for national security. Canada’s requirement is generally self-imposed through the Agreement on 
Internal Trade (AIT) with the provinces and territories. In the case of the AIT, there is a similar 
national security clause but it is contained in the final provisions chapter rather than the 
procurement chapter. In this context the AIT is not well aligned with NAFTA and the WTO-
                                                          
71 See Industry Canada, Innovation Canada: A Call to Action: Review of Federal Support to Research and 
Development – Expert Panel Report (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2011), 7-4 and the Canada Excellence Research 
Chairs website at www.cerc.gc.ca. 
72 Jenkins, xiv. 
  
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities: Lessons for Canada from Australia 
by Criag Stone 
 
January, 2014 
Page 22 
 
Prioritizing Defence Industry Capabilities 
AGP. Because AIT defines any domestically registered company as Canadian, it effectively opens 
up all Canadian procurement to international companies.73 This is an important issue in terms 
of balancing OTS purchases with protecting Canadian industry. The defence market is imperfect 
with one buyer and in many cases only one seller. Any argument for competition must be made 
based on the knowledge that there is a marketplace with more than one seller. Without that 
marketplace, there is no real economic benefit to competition. More importantly, the 
requirement to compete can actually prevent industry from being engaged early in the 
development process because they risk having their intellectual property released to a 
competitor as part of the Statement of Requirement when the process reaches the Request for 
Proposal stage.  
 
The most important reason for conducting a more holistic procurement review is really no 
different than reasons that Australia conducted its reviews. The process is not serving 
government, industry and most importantly, the military as well as it should be. And while there 
may be benefits for Canada to create a separate procurement organization, (as some have 
recently argued) there needs to be work done to demonstrate with evidence that this is the case. 
That can only be done based on having a clear understanding of what is wrong, what can be 
improved and what needs to change completely. As Stone has recently indicated, creating a 
separate agency will not fix cost overruns, delivery delays and equipment not meeting 
operational requirements, the three most common issues that plague most western nations’ 
procurement purchases.74  
 
Lesson 4 
The North American Defence Industrial Base is an Opportunity and a Constraint. 
 
Regardless of the outcome of a procurement review, there are still some immediate lessons that 
can be captured from the Australian experience. As indicated in the earlier discussion on the 
state of Australian industry, Canada’s industry is quite similar. The PICs and SICs identified by 
Australia could provide a starting point for the development of a Canadian list of priorities. 
However, because Canada’s defence industries are part of the larger North American Defence 
Industrial Base, the list will not be identical and there will need to be some consideration given 
to how Canada approaches the development of policy. For example, Canadian industries that 
provide significant exports to the US market will not be interested in giving up that business just 
to have their industry on the priority list without some assurance that subsequent Canadian 
business will be at the same level. In other words, in the same way that Australian industry was 
identifying the need for a long term commitment of identifiable acquisitions, Canadian industry 
would be looking for the same assurances. 
 
In a more pragmatic context, the development of a Canadian priority capabilities list would need 
to be done in consultation with the US as part of a broader determination of North American 
priorities. There would almost certainly be restrictions imposed as a result of our relationship 
                                                          
73 Ugurhan Berkok, “Canadian Defence Procurement,” Chapter 7 in Defence Procurement and Industry Policy: A 
Small Country Perspective, edited by Stefan Markowski, Peter Hall, and Robert Wylie (New York: Routledge, 2010), 
215 and 225. For a more specific discussion on the AIT see Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence 
Procurement: A View from Inside, (Montreal and Kingston: Breakout Education Network and McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2006). 
74 See J.C. Stone, A Separate Defence Procurement Agency: Will it Actually Make a Difference? Strategic Studies 
Working Group Papers Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (February 
2012). 
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with US parent industries and US requirements around sensitive technologies (ITARs issues are 
one example). However, there is also clear benefit for Canadian industry if an identified 
capability is a North American requirement rather than just Canadian. The economies of scale 
associated with a North American requirement would reduce unit costs for Canada. 
 
Clearly this will be a challenge but there will be some common areas based on the Australian 
experience. Further discussion with Australia might even provide a mechanism to support one 
another where economically feasible. The Light Armoured Vehicle Turret is an example where 
both Australia and Canada are involved in the production process for upgrading an existing 
weapon system where the Prime (General Dynamics) is a US owned company. 
 
Lesson 5 
Defence industry needs to be involved throughout the process as a partner. 
 
The performance of the defence industry is critical to the long term development and 
sustainment of both the ADF and the Canadian Forces. The Government of Australia realizes 
this and is trying to strike a balance between finding value for money and creating a competitive 
defence industrial base while at the same time ensuring that key capability requirements are 
available in Australia. In the case of Canada, the requirement for early involvement by industry 
and regular discussions about requirements was highlighted by the 2009 CADSI report for 
Ministers. Issues around intellectual property and the dynamics associated with the AIT need to 
be addressed as part of this early engagement in order to ensure no one is disadvantaged. In this 
context, the evolution of the Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation Program (and a 
similar program in the United Kingdom (Niteworks)) has been key in bringing together industry 
and government early in the process to find solutions for problems without compromising 
subsequent activity. Canada’s own version of this, Project Accord, should continue to be 
developed and implemented.75 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the discussions above there are a number of areas that should or could be considered 
by Canada moving forward, particularly since most of the major acquisitions listed in the 
Canada First Defence Strategy have yet to come to fruition. Rather than provide a large number 
of very specific recommendations that would need to be articulated with Canada’s specific 
circumstances in mind, particularly the relationship with the US and the connection to the 
North American Defence Industrial Base, the paper will provide a limited number of very broad 
macro level recommendations. These recommendations flow from the discussions provided 
above but do not require as many caveats or restrictions.  
 
Perhaps one exception to this is that it is the view of the author that politically there are very few 
benefits for the Canadian Government to action any of the recommendations because there is no 
perceived consequence for inaction. Australian politicians have a much better awareness of the 
requirements associated with national security because Australia is geographically located in a 
region of the world that has significant security challenges. This is not the case with Canada. 
Canadian politicians are not generally interested in defence and security issues because they do 
not believe there is a security risk. This is even more important during times of fiscal restraint 
when it is the economy and domestic issues that take priority. Despite this caveat, the following 
                                                          
75 DND has received the Project Accord Options Analysis Study Final Report dated 31 March 2012 which contains a 
recommendation for the way forward. 
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recommendations are provided as a way to improve the connections between industry, the CF 
and government and this will ultimately be useful if only to bring some coherence to policy 
across multiple jurisdictions. 
 
Recommendation 1:  
Canada should develop a defence industrial policy that provides a clear articulation of what 
industries are important and must be resident in Canada in order to sustain the CF.  
 
Developing a defence industrial policy is consistent with what our traditional allies have done in 
the past decade and is consistent with the recommendations from CADSI and the 2009 industry 
and procurement study completed for the Ministers of Defence, Public Works and Industry. 
More importantly, based on the Australian experience and what has been discussed above it will 
help improve the relationship between government and industry by providing some clarity to 
expectations and priorities. 
 
Although not discussed in this report, Project Accord in Canada is similar to the RPDE program 
in Australia and could be used as the forum to start the discussion and the development of 
industry capabilities that should be a priority. This would be similar to the process used by 
Australia to develop its PICs. Canada and Australia could work together to come up with shared 
solutions to common problems. 
 
Recommendation 2:  
In conjunction with a defence industry policy government should also provide a public version 
of its expected defence capability requirements so that industry can make appropriate 
investment decisions.  
 
As discussed in this report, industry needs clarity over the long term in order to make 
investment decisions. As shown in Figure 1 of this report, the ADF has connected its classified 
planning guidance and defence industry self-reliance plan with a public version of a defence 
capability plan and the PICs. This should not be that difficult for the CF and DND because the 
existing departmental Investment Plan developed for the Treasury Board contains most of the 
information that would be required in a public version of a capability plan.  
 
Recommendation 3:   
Canada should conduct a thorough review of its entire procurement process in order to 
capture those areas that need improvement.  
 
Conducting a procurement review will provide the necessary validation and mechanism for the 
government to make changes to the existing process in order to fix the problems that are 
currently being experienced. As discussed in this report, Australia has conducted two reviews in 
the last decade in order to improve how it assesses, acquires and maintains defence capability. 
These reviews have proven to be beneficial to Australia. This was clearly articulated in the 2008 
review when Mortimer discussed the improvements that had been made since the original 2003 
Kinnaird review. A similar review in Canada needs to be completed and needs to examine all 
parts of the process including the processes internal to DND, PWGSC, Industry Canada and all 
the other actors that can be involved in a Canadian procurement project.  
 
A procurement review should be chaired by someone outside of the government. Only then can 
a credible evidence based decision be made as to whether or not Canada should create a 
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separate procurement agency similar to Australia or the United Kingdom or make changes to 
the existing process.  
 
Recommendation 4:  
Ideally Defence procurement and the issue of national security should be explicitly removed 
from the Agreement on Internal Trade 
 
The removal of defence and national security from the AIT is not likely to get provincial support 
and would be difficult for the government. Recognizing this problem, an attempt should be 
made to amend the AIT so that defence procurement and the issue of national security are 
brought in line with the NAFTA and the WTO-AGP.  This would move the text from the final 
provisions chapter to the chapter on procurement.  
 
In addition, the rules around competition must be amended so that industry can be engaged as 
part of the development process without concern about losing Intellectual Property to 
competitors in the subsequent proposal stage. This is consistent with similar concerns discussed 
above whereby the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit noted the industry suspicion that 
would exist with becoming involved with the needs definition stage without IP protection.  
 
Developing a set of coherent policy statements like those found in Australia would provide 
clarity to both industry and those government departments that are involved in the procurement 
process. More importantly, the development of a set of coherent policy statements requires a 
long term strategic view of the relationship between industry and defence. A defence industrial 
policy must be consistent with a broader national level industrial policy that actually articulates 
where Canada wants to have a competitive advantage in the future. A defence industrial policy 
needs to articulate what is strategically important to Canada moving forward. There is already 
some activity in this area with the funding associated with the Canada Excellence Research 
Chairs program and the Innovation Canada report provides yet another mechanism for the 
government to take a more holistic and longer term strategic view of Canada’s needs. The 
recommendations for six key industrial clusters in the Jenkins’ report is also a move in the right 
direction but only if those clusters can be confirmed and/or expanded based on empirical 
evidence that supports a clear connection between defence spending and economic benefits.  All 
of this must be done based on a solid understanding of what is actually working and what is not 
working in the procurement process. Although another review may be met with frustration, a 
broad based review of the entire procurement process is the only way to ensure the government 
is fixing what actually needs fixing. 
 
The Australian experience with articulating priority industry capabilities is an approach worth 
looking at to obtain lessons and best practices.  It is not, however, a panacea for all that ails 
defence procurement. There will always be friction as government tries to balance multiple 
competing interests, including industry. As articulated in this paper, Australian industry 
continues to have concerns about how the Australian Government is implementing its industrial 
priorities. The development of a coherent set of policies that is connected to military capability 
requirements is achievable with the right direction and coordination.  
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ANNEX A 
 
AUSTRALIAN PRIORITY INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES 
Acoustic technologies and systems 
Anti-tampering capabilities 
Combat uniform and personal equipment 
Electronic warfare 
High end system and ‘system of systems’ integration 
High Frequency and phased array radars 
Infantry Weapons and remote weapon stations 
In-service support of Collins-class submarine combat systems 
Selected ballistic munitions and explosives 
Ship Dry-docking facilities and common-user facilities 
Signature management 
Through-life and real time support of mission critical and safety critical software 
 
AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES 
Composite and exotic materials 
Elements of national infrastructure, including: 
o Supply and storage of aviation fuel 
o Provision of terrestrial and space communications systems 
o Logistic infrastructure for using Darwin and Townsville 
Geospatial information and systems 
Guided weapons 
Naval shipbuilding 
Protection of networks, computers and communications 
Repair and maintenance of specialist airborne early warning and control systems 
Repair, maintenance and upgrading of armoured vehicles 
Repair, maintenance and upgrading of aircraft (including helicopters) 
Secure test facilities and test ranges 
Systems assurance 
System life cycle management 
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